STUDIES IN ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE.*
II. TIlE

RULE-IAKING AUTHORITY.

VIII.
As compared with the Rules of 1875, the physical bulk of
the new Rules was their first attribute to draw the attenition. Together with the twelve sets of amending Rules launched between
1875 and 1883, the old Rules amounted to less than six hundred
in number; the new came up to the imposing total of eleven hundred, divided into seventy-two Orders, as against the sixty-three
Orders of old. But the fear that such an increase was oppressive was soon dispelled when it was discovered that nearly four
hundred of the Rules were transcriptions from previously scattered statutes and regulations, so that there had beei completed
a true code of procedure. In fact, the Rule Committee had consolidated over eighteen hundred scattered sections of statutes and
rules into a fairly compact and logical arrangement, 251 and the
Statute Law Revision Act in 1883 completed the work by repealing practically all old procedural legislation rendered obsolete by the new code. 252 Roughly one-half of the new Rules are
reproductions, with or without alterations, of Rules in the
Schedule of 1875 or its amendments ;213 the other half are prinand only about onecipally devoted to replacing statutory rules,
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"lAs stated by Mr. James (now Viscount) Bryce, in the debate in the
House of Commons.
' The full text of the Rules of 1883 can best be consulted in Wilson:
Judicature Acts and Rules (4th ed., London, 1883).. A few subjects were
omitted both from the repealing acts and from the new Rules, whether by
intention or inadvertence does not seem clear. They include the Rules made
undcr the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1867; the Liquidation Act, 1868; the
Debtors Act, 1869; the Settled Land Act, 1882, and the Conveyancing Act,
i882. The full list is given in F. R. Parker: Analytical Index of the Judicature Acts and Rules (London, 1883), p. v of introduction.
Five hundred and forty-two out of the whole eleven hundred. Of
the old Rules, one hundred and eighty-nine are reproduced ipsissinis verbis,
two hundred and thirty-three slightly altered and one hundred and twenty
materially altered. Thirty-seven are omitted.
'Three hundred and ninety-four of the new Rules derive from old
statutes or regulations. Of these twenty-eight are reproduced ipsisinis
(380)
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In general arrangement the new Rules correspond closely to
the old; wherever possible the Order numbers were retained, so
as to create the least inconvenience, and the new matter was introduced largely by increasing the length of Orders here and
there throughout the Schedule rather than by merely adding it in
separate Orders at the end. In this manner, despite their tripartite origin, the Rules remained in their familiar form, and practitioners could, without deep research, turn with reasonable confidence to the part of the book in which they needed to look for
any particular Rule,
The new matter in the Rules, though scattered all through
them according to its place in the chronological sequence of the
Orders, falls into two classes, of which the first consists of Rules
imported from statutes and regulations almost unchanged, to
consolidate the law, and the second of Rules'which effect material alterations or introduce entirely new. ideas in the court's
procedure.2 55 Most of the former are drawn from the Chancery
Amendment Acts and the Consolidated Chancery Orders of
186o, as the framers of the 1875 Schedule had been satisfied to
let the old chancery practice remain pretty much as it was beThus regulations were introduced affecting investment
fore."
of funds in court, suits in for-na pauperis, the administration and
execution of trusts, the taking of accounts, the use and making
of affidavits, the examination of witnesses out of court and the
perpetuation of testimony, the appointment of receivers and the
use of equitable execution, sales of property by the court, the
conduct of matters in chambers, the duties of clerks and registrars, and other items of what had been exclusively chancery business. Another important subject upon which a considerable
body of Rules was added was that of costs; these come princivrrbis. two hundred and eighty-three slightly altered and eighty-three materially altered. The remaining one hundred and sixty-four Rules contain the
provisions altogether new.
'"Three hundred and eleven Rules belong in the first class, three hundred and sixty-seven Rules in the second. A detailed analysis showing the
source of each of the eleven hundred new Rules, and the disposition made
of the old Rules and statutes drawn from, will be found in Parker, op. cit.
'Twenty-two of the Consolidated Orders were drawn upon for Rules,
especially Order I, from which twenty-six, Order XXXV, from which fortyeight, and Order XL, from which nineteen, were taken.
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pally from a special Order on costs issued as an amendment to
the 1875 Schedule, but also from old rules on both sides of the
court. Admiralty rules form another important addition, as do
rules on interpleader proceedings. There are many minor additions, as there were twelve statutes and fourteen different sets of
rules drawn upon in all, apart from the 1875 Schedule itself.217
But the three hundred and sixty-seven Rules which represent the distinctively new element in procedure are the ones that
contain the most interest. These are the kernel of the reforms
introduced into the Judicature Rules by Lord Selborne 5 s and
are the fruit of the recommendations made by his Legal Procedure Committee in i88i. Other influences that helped to develop them were the Law Society's Report upon the Legal Procedure Committee's work, a large number of decisions in the
Court of Appeal interpreting doultf1l sections in the Schedule
Of 1875, and, not least, the discusaons of the Rule Committee
itself, aided by the Lord Chancelri onstant and personal co2 59
operation.
As described above, pleading was the first large problem the
Committee tackled and its solution was to command that all
pleadings should be more concise and that the parties might, if
they chose, or must, in certain cases at a master's order, dispense
with pleadings altogether. A complete set of forms was provided in the new Appendices to guide the pleader in the way he
'The

full list (given in Parker, op. cit.) includes the x Henry VII,

C. 12 (one Rule), 9 & o Will. I1, c. x (one Rule), t Will. IV, c. 22 (three
Rules), 1 & 2 Will. IV, C. S8 (three Rules), 5 & 6 Vict., c. 69 (two Rules),
15 & 16 Vict., c. 76 (twelve Rules), c. 8o (twelve Rules). c. 86 (nineteen
Rules), i6 & 17 Vict., c. 78 (one Rule), 17 & 18 Vict, c. 128 (fifteen Rlhs),
23 & 24 Vict., c. 126 (seven Rides), 24 & 25 Vict., c. 1o (one Rule), & R,lg.

Gen. of Hilar Term, 1853 '(twenty-nine Rules), the Reg. Gen. of Trinity
Term. 1853 (ive Rules), the Chanc. Reg., 1857 (fifteen Rules), the Admiralty Rules, 1859 (fifty-one Rus, the Consolida.d Orders of the Court of
Chancery, x86o (one hundred and eighty-*ine Rules), t
Chancery Or r
of March 2o, z86o (four RulS), of Febnmiy T, 18 (two Rules), of February 5, x86x (two Rules), of Novemser, s86* (one Rule), of tN6 (ten
Rules), the Reg. Gen. of Jbm 6; if
(one ide%, of 1NIWamu Ters, ift
(six Rules), the Chancery Order of JaUatr 7, ISYD (ane Ink), an the
Admiralty Rules of 1871 (me Rule).
An analysis of thes with similar proviuina hr
old ]taiee ;n
parallel columns, by John Eldon (now Mrnust)
h
ap
d 1. 7S
LAw T,t!Es, pp. 288, 300, 3r3, 328, 34!, 352, 36t 375,3%
4 4 md 432.
'"One gathers.-from the remiiscenees of conmp
a
t AM
were not dull, as the Committee was fairly divided in ahbt o41
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should go, and it is there that the changes called for are most
clearly indicated. On the whole, competent critics declared that
the effect was to return to a system very much like that in use
under the Common Law Procedure Acts, but there is no doubt
that the device of requiring conformity to the official forms was
a longer step towards bringing pleading up to the standard of
the Judicature Act ideal than anything that had been tried before. Comment on the forms themselves, qua forms, has always
20 0
been divided in tone. A contemporary critic said:
"The forms of pleading must be consideied as much superior to those which they supersede. . . . With these models
before his eves no one who understands his profession, and who
is instructed with reasonable care, can fail to state with clearness the nature of the case."
On the other hand, a somewhat reactioniry article in the
Encyclopaedia Brittanica 2 0 1 which attacks the Rules as a whole
declares: "It is true that these forms do not display a high degree of excellence in draftsmanship," and one of the present
King's Bench masters whose opinion on matters of procedure
is in the highest degree expert testified before the recent Royal
Commission on Delay in the King's Bench Division that "one of
the great difficulties that one has to deal with in dealing with
the pleadings is that the Rules are altogether inconsistent
The Rules say one thing and the. forms
with the forms. .
2 2
say another."
Wlether precise or not, however, the forms indicated the
changes the committee wished made, and in that purpose they
were successful. In the new pleading, moreover, precision of
form has lost its former glory completely and been forgotten together with the time when "the form was preferred to the subLord Coleridge and Lord Justice Lindley were the keenest advocates of new
provisions; Sir James Hannen and Mr. Justice Manisty, opposed to violent
changes, exercised an influence for restraint and accuracy.
' 27 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 611 (July 14, 1883).

Vritten in 1902 for
14 ith ed., vol. 15, P. 54x, tit. "Judicature Acts:'
the Supplement to the 9th ed. by Lord Davey, then a member of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.
' Master T. Willes Chitty. "Minutes of Evidence taken before the
Commission" (Parl. Paper Cd. 6762, 1913), vol. I, p. 23.
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stance, the statement to the thing stated. "2- 53

Two innovations

made in 1883 finally disposed of its ancient high estate. One is
the brief Rule that "No technical objection shall be raised to any
pleading on the ground of any alleged want of form,"2- 4 ind the
other is the abolition of demurrers. This last was the most important reform introduced by the Rule Committee on its own initiative and was its strongest blow against the hateful rule of
technicality. Under the court's new liberality in allowing
amendments, the use of demurrers had, it is true, degenerated
into a sort of rapier play by which a party would drive his opponent to amend a pleading without really affecting the result of
the action. They were principally useful for their annoyance
and their cost. "No instrument was better adapted for deciding
a genuine point of law, fairly raised on the pleadings, and going
to the substance of the case; but it was so seldom that these conditions were all combined, that proceedings on demurrer were
more often than not a vexation to those who had to argue them,
and a useless increase of costs. It must be said, indeed, that the
prejudice against demurrers was so great upon the bench, that
they did not by any means get fair play; probably a consciousness of the injustice which, in former times, the court had often
allowed demurrers to inflict on suitors, united its influence with
a daily increasing reluctance to lay down strict legal principles, in
bringing them into disfavor.

2

65
1

The consequence was that the

whole tradition of arguments on demurrer was shaken off.
In place of ihe demurrer ("No demurrer shall be allowed"
says the Rule2 0 succinctly) the pleader is privileged to raise an
"objection in point of law," which will be disposed of, in the ordinary case, either at or after the trial of the facts, instead of at
some time before.26 T In addition, there are powers to have the
"point of law" argued before the trial if actually necessary, to
make the decision on the argument apply to the whole or only to
7 Lord Chief Justice Coleridge to the American Bar Association, at
New York, October ix, z883.
'Order XIX, Rule a&
27 SoLcIoIRs' JOURNAL, 69z (August t8, 1883).

'"Order XXV, Rule z. 'It is open to both parties to raise such an objection.
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parts of the claim or defence, and finally, for very clear cases, to
order a whole pleading struck out "on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or answer. ' 268 It is only in
exceptional cases, however, that a point of law will be decided
before the facts themselves are heard; the application will be refused "especially if the decision of the question of law will not
necessarily dispose of the whole matter." 269
This provides an
with due regard
under
which,
elastic and comprehensive system
to the actual proved facts of a case, substantial points of law,
either small or great, "can still be raised on the pleadings as
neatly as and with greater facility than before. '270 The only objection to this improvement came from those to whom the old
punctilio and preciseness of common law pleadings was still dear;
they bewailed the .passing of the old order. "Formerly the pleader
had the fear of a demurrer before him," complains Lord Davey ;2T7"Nowadays he need not stop to think whether his cause
of action or defence will hold water or not, and anything which
is not obviously frivolous or vexatious will do by way of pleading for the purpose of the trial and for getting the opposite party
into the box."
But such a comment overlooks the new channel through
which all actions must flow before reaching trial, the channel
which takes them through the masters' chambers under the safe
conduct of the summons for directions. The "omnibus 'summons" proposed by Lord Selborne's Procedure Committee in
1881 has, indeed, found a place in the Rules and by virtue of its
authority the master stands as arbiter between the parties and
the court. Upon its issue, soon after the defendant has appeared,
the action is assigned to one of the masters who thereafter has
complete charge of the proceedings up to trial; no step can be
taken without his leave, and his decisions clear the air of many
matters that might cloud the issues when they come to trial. 27 2
'Order XXV, Rules 2, 3, 4.

'Prr Lindley, L.J. (who was active in the Rule Committee), in Cock-

sedge v. Metropolitan Coal Co.. 65 LAW TniEs REPORTS, 432, 434 (189i).
*"18 LAW JOURNAL, 409 (July 28, 1883).
'Encyclopaedia Britannica, cited supra.
'"Order XXX. The summons for directions was optional in 1883, but.
has since been made compulsory in all but a very few cases.
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His presence is the visible symbol of the control over the course
of an action, now lost to the parties themselves, which is exercised by the court.
One of the most useful of his functions is the treatment of
claims for which summary judgment may be given; these included liquidated money claims under the old Rules, and in 1883
were extended to cover actions for the ejectment of a tenant of
real property whose term has expired or been determined'by notice to quit. 2? 3 Where the defence is not shown, on affidavit, to
go to the merits, final judgment is at once given by the master;
wherever there does seem to be a question for trial in such cases
it is almost invariably a question of fact, usually as to the amount
due, and the master may then admit the defendant to a..cfence,
on proper terms. Under the 1875 Rules, the payment into court
of the sum in dispute was the only condition he could impose;
the 1883 changes make him free to dictate the time and mode of
trial as further conditions to defence..2 74 He can put an end to
delay by ordering an immediate trial by a judge without a jury,
on the writ and affidavit, without further pleadings or interlocu27 5
tory applications of any sort.
Another matter which is dealt with on the summons for
directions, in which changes were introduced in 1883, is the
granting of discovery. To administer interrogatories no leave
had been necessary under the former Judicature Rules, but the
1883 Rules make the leave of the master prerequisite in all cases
except actions involving fraud or breach of trust,"- 5 and before
granting leave the master is required to take into account any offer by the other side to give particulars, make admissions, or
produce documents. Then the order for discovery of documents
Order 111, Rule 6. This extension was in response to a request made
in the report of the Law Society's committee which reviewed the work of
the Legal Prtocedure Comnitte

'"Order XIV, Rule 6.
'To make these cases come to trial without delay a separate list was
established in 189.3, called the Short Cause List. into which cases may he put
which can be tried in a half-hour. This list is taken on Saturday mornings,
and frequently judgment will be entered within a fortnight of the defendants
appearance, even though he contests the claim.
" Order XXXI, Rule x. This exception was removed in 1893.
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is somewhat modified; although previously granted of course, it
is provided that it may be limited to certain classes of documents or to documents affecting only a part of the case, or be refused altogether. 277 Finally, a party seeking either to administer interrogatories or to obtain discovery of documents is required to deposit ino court the sum of Five Pounds as an earnest
of good faith, to cover the costs, which sum he will be repaid
only if it develops that his step in seeking recovery was reasonable. 2 7
All these restrictions were imposed to carry out the
Legal Procedure Committee's recommiendation that the right to
discovery should be curtailed because it had become a source of
needless expense. Besides these limitations a few useful extensions are made in the practice; one is to permit a party to call on
his opponent to admit certain facts or bear the costs of having
them proved ;270 another is that bankers' and other business
books may be inspected at their usual place of custody, instead
of at a solicitor's office. 28 0
Payment into court is another interlocutory step into which
an important change is introduced. Previously such a payment
could only be understood as an admission of the claim pro tanto,
and the claimant was always entitled to go on with the action in
an attempt to recover more. The 1883 Rules introduce a new
form of payment in, which makes it possible for a defendant,
with his defence, to pay money into court "with a denial of liability." 2 1 The advantage of this is that though it may be less
than the plaintiff claims, the plaintiff must, if he accepts the sum
and wishes to take the money out of court, accept it in full satisfaction of his claim, and cannot, after taking it out, go on with
the action in an attempt to recover more. If, on the other hand,
he rejects the sum paid in as insufficient and does not take it out,
" Order XXXI, Rule 12. The order for discovery of documents is
now,. however, practically never refused or limited.
'Order XXX, Rule 26. This restriction was removed in i905, and
t ecurity for the costs of discovery is now ordered only in exceptional cases.
'Order XXXII, Rule 4. This carried out a recommendation, hitherto
unnoticed, of the original Judicature Commission of 1869. It is. however,
a procedure not frequently resorted to.
'Ordcr XXXI, Rule z7. This saves business people much annoyance.
"1Order XXII, Rules i and 6. This was one of the provisions developed
out of the decisions in the Court of Appeal.
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and then, at the trial, recovers less than that amount, he is liable to pay the defendant's costs. The object of this innovation
is to provide a medium of compromise for cases where the defendant is willing to pay something for the sake of peace, rather
than incur the expense and risk of proving he is not at fault. In
the same Order is included a most beneficent provision that
money recovered by or for infants is to be held in court and invested or paid out only as directed by the judge, rather than
28
banded over to the infant's guardian or solicitor. '
The Rules on trial and judgment were subjected to soine alterations, none of them of a startling nature. Order XXXVI,
on mode. of trial, was recast so as to nmake it more evident that
trial by a judge alone was considered the form most favored. In
actions for slander, libel, or other attacks upon reputation, an absolute right to have a jury as of course is preserved; in all other
actions, a special application for a jury must be made. This application will ordinarily be granted except in cases involving prolonged or scientific investigation of facts, accounts, or documents, and for issues which properly belong in the Chancery Division. But the normal mode of trial is that without a jury. A
further incentive to the parties to avoid jury trials is the creation of separate lists for the jury and non-jury actions ; s the,
latter are always disposed of more quickly than the former, so
the court is more approximately abreast of its work in that. list,
while the jury trials are often weeks behind. As with other parts
of the Rules, miscellaneous improvements are effected in minor
matters; among others, the master is given jurisdiction to try interpleader issues,2s which usually arise out of execution on a
judgment and ought not to be held up bybeing set down in a list
for trial in court; any trial or appeal judge is authorized himself
to inspect any property or thing in dispute ;M although judgment
.Order XXII, Rule z . This Rule has since been altered, to make the

newly (i9o6) created Public Trustee the custodian of the fund. Guardians
of infants are not required in England to give bond.
'This and the other alterations in Order XXXVI were made upon the
recommendation of the Legal Procedure Committee.
'Order LVII, Rule &
Order L, Rule 4, an equivalent of the jury's "view."
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is usually entered as of the day when it is pronounced, the court
is given power to order that it should be antedated or postdated
if necessary ;.86 and it is provided that'a judgment creditor may
issue execution for the amount of his judgment alone without
waiving the right to issue a later writ for the amount of his
costs. 21 7

Then there are several changes as to the relation of

parties to judgments; new trials may be granted as to some of
the parties, while the result as to others is left untouched ;288 if
some of several defendants fail to appear, the plaintiff may, if
his claim is unliquidated, take interlocutory judgment against
those in default and have his damages assessed finally at the trial
of the others; 2 9 and the third party procedure is improved by
making it possible to sign judgment in -the principal action
against the third party, instead of having to sue him in a separate action after his liability has been established. 290
A most interesting innovation of important consequences
and deserving of separate mention is Order XXV Rule 5, which
permits the court to make binding declarations of rights,
"whether consequential relief is or could be claimed or not."
This introduces for the first time the practice of giving decisions
on points not actually in litigation. It is limited, however, to
cases where the plaintiff has a cause of action, the court awarding merely a declaration asserting his right without awarding
damages or an injunction; and it has been held that the declaration claimed must be ancillary to the putting in suit some legal
right. 291 Its most useful application is when, in an action against
'eOrder XLI, Rule 3, a power exercised, for instance, when judgment
has been reserved and rights are prejudiced by the delay.
'Order XLII, Rule 18. Formerly he had to include costs in the first
writ or waive them.
I Order' XXXIX, Rule 6. The practice on applications for new trials
is assimilated to that on appeals. The motion now is to the Court of
Appeal, and is usually "for judgment or a new triaL"
'Order XIII, Rule 6. This Rule supplied an obvious omission in the
old Rules on default.
' Order XVI, Rule 52. This had been held necessary under the old
Rules. The new Rules also clear up a doubt by expressly providing that a
defendant may make one of his co-defendants the third party from whom he
claims indemnity.
'Per Collins, M. R., in Williams v. Collieries [T904], 2 K. B. 44, 49.
The Rule is an extension of the Chancery Amendment Act of x852 to include
future rights.
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one member alone of a numerous class, for the infringement of
a right they are all violating, a declaration is asked for that the
right exists as against them all.
Then costs, the subject which had so agitated the Procedure
Committee, was raised to the dignity of one of the largest Orders in the Rules. Instead of a brief four-line Order, leaving all
costs to the discretion of the judge, there is now a long Order 292
containing twenty-seven Rules and fifty-eight sub-Rules, collated
from the previous Rules issued under the Judicature Act as an
amendment to the 1875 Schedule, the Chancery Orders on costs,
and the new provisions suggested in the Procedure Committee's
Report. The latter are, in the main, the requirement of a uniform
scale of costs in all Divisions of the court and the setting out in
detail of higher and lower scales of fees to be applied by'the
taxing masters in allowing costs,-the lower scale to be applied
in ordinary cases, the higher in those of unusual difficulty. The
drafting of these scales and the adjustment of the charges in their
various parts in proportion was considered a work requiring the
greatest knowledge of the details of practice, and was entrusted
to Richard Bloxam, the old Senior Taxing Master of the day.
He worked on these scales under the personal supervision of Lord
Selborne, and in the subsequent revision in Committee, Sir George
Jessel proved of great service in protecting the interests of
solicitors, so that proper provision might be made for their remuneration in every class of work coming into the court. In
Rule 27, which is for the guidance of taxing masters, there are a
few innovations which it may be of interest to point out: parts
of any papers used in the action which the taxing master, in his
discretion, considers unnecessary, may be struck out ;293 he is not
to allow the costs of more than one extension of time for the
doing of any act in the cause, unless such extension was due to
' Order LXV.
Order LXV, Rule 27 (2o). Two interesting Rules as to the sufficiency of affidavits may be here noted. Order XXXVIII, Rule rt, provides
that a judge may order to be struck out from any affidavit any matter which
is scandalous: and Order XXXVIII, Rule 16, provides that no affidavit shall
be sufficient if sworn before the solicitor acting for the party on whose
behalf the affidavit is to be used, or before any agent or correspondent of
such solicitor, or before the party himself.
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some cause other than the party's fault ;294 he is not to allow the
costs of any steps which have been due either to the party's overcaution or to his neglect ;29' and when costs are payable out of
some fund he may direct that some of the interested beneficiaries
be represented at the taxation, if they are not already before him.
A new Rule on unnecessary costs which aroused great comment
in 1883 is one which provides that a solicitor may be m',de to
pay out of his own pocket any costs improperly incurred, as well
as costs which, though properly incurred in the cause, have,
296
through his neglect, proved fruitless to his client.
None of the improvements outlined in the foregoing paragraphs has, however, had results which can compare in breadth
of scope with the benefits which have been obtained through the
development of the chamber work in the Chancery Division
brought about by the perfection of what is known as the "originating summons," first introduced into the Rules of the Supreme
Court in the revision of 1883.297 To understand what a reformation it effected it is necessary to appreciate the difficulty it was
designed to meet.
Decedents' estates are not administered, as a rule, in England, under the close supervision of the courts which is imposed
in American systems of distribution. Once the will has been
proved or letters of administration have been issued the executor
or administrator goes ahead with the work of collecting and liquidating the assets and paying them out to creditors or beneficiaries,
without reference to any court for the approval of claims or the
audit of accounts. He is bound to account to the persons .interested under the will, as any other trustee is to his cestuis que
trust, but there is no court to which he must, in the ordinary case,
submit his account for adjudication. Only if he fails to administer his trust with due diligence or in good faith, or if it is known
Order LXV, Rule 27 (z4).

Ovder LXV. hI. :97

(29).

.."Order LXV, Rtfie ii. This was bitterly attacked by the solicitors ia
z8ft. but it has remained unaltered and its applicatis, while not frequent,

is not rme
m Ord r LV, *

3

M.
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that he contemplates taking some step-which the persons interested under the will consider will be inimical to their interests, or
if the estate is insolvent, or if there is some doubt or dispute as
to the persons rightfully entitled to receive funds or property
from him, especially when he Wishes to protect himself against
a possible insufficiency of assets by an order of court before making any payments, is there any occasion for his coming or being
brought into court. By gradual extension of its powers the Court
of Chancery had, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, assumed exclusive jurisdiction over difficulties arising out of the
distribution of decedents' estates,298 and it was to equity that dissatisfied creditors or legatees and cautious executors or administrators turned fcqr relief when any such occasion arose. There
was but one way under the Od equity procedure to obtain the
benefit of the chancery machinery, and that was to bring a bill
asking that the entire estate be administered by the Court of
Chancery. Whenever, there fore, a single creditor felt aggrieved
or a doubt arose out of a sing.e phrase in the will there would
be a struggle, more or less protracted, on bill, answer and affidavits, which would result in a judgment that all the funds and
property in the estate should be paid into court; this would be
followed by the taking of accounts and inventories ab initio of all
the decedent's estate, real and personal, and of his debts, devises
and legacies, all the items in which would have to be corroborated
by affidavits and inquired into seriatim by a force of chief clerks,
junior clerks, assistant clerks and other clerks to the chancery
judges. Once the judgment was entered, the trustee became
merely the agent of the court to receive and pay money, although
each sum had to be handed on by him to the court after formal
permission to pay it in had been granted, and no money could be
The growth is traced in Story, Pomeroy, and other works on Equity
Jurisprudence. By reason of the creation by statute of probate courts which
enforce the payment of a decedent's debts and legacies and demand an accounting from his executors and administrators, the equitable jurisdiction to administer decedents' estates has fallen into disuse in the State courts of the
United States; it might still be invoked in the Federal courts by reason of
diverse citizenship of parties. See Pomeroy, §zi29. In most of the States,
however, the ordinary courts of equity would still exercise jurisdiction over
the administration of any trusts that were created in a will
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paid out until the court paymaster had been amply fortified with
affidavits and certificates of authority for each separate payment.
If there was property to be sold, the court would transact the sale
itself, going into such infinite detail as to draw up, by its "conveyancing counsel," the auctioneer's "conditions of sale," the
terms of payment and settlement, and the form for the public advertisement. When at last there was some distribution to be made
there were more formalities about the proper certification and
arrangement of the numerous and complicated priorities which
the English law establishes in such a distribution. Every step in
this process was attended with appointments before judges' clerks,
repeated adjournments for time or further consideiation, copying
of documents, drawing up of reports, drafting of orders, and
such shoals of affidavits and summonses that the weary beneficiaries were happy when they were at length rewarded with some
proportion of the wealth that they had to watch slowly dissolving
299
from their grasp.
By i85o the courts were beginning to realize they existed for
the benefit of suitors, and the great Common Law Procedure Act
was followed by several statutes effecting changes in the procedure of the Court of Chancery. One of these, the Amendment
Act of 1852, contained a provision touching the particular problem now in hand.30 0 It enacted that any person claiming to be a
creditor of any deceased person or interested under his will might,
without filing a bill in equity or taking any preliminary proceedings, summon the executor or administrator to appear in the
chambers of a chancery judge, there to show cause why "the usual
order for the administration of the estate of the deceased" should
not be made. This had the effect of eliminating the expense and
delay of the proceedings prior to the judgment for administra, See Parkes: History of the Court of Chancery, or Mr. Birrell's lecture: Changes in Equity Procedure and Principles, in: A Century of Law
Reform. For a technical but admirably lucid account of the present procedure in the administration of a decedent's estate by the Chancery Division,
see Stephen: Commentaries on the Laws of England, revised by Edward
Jenks (I6th ed., London, 1914), voL 3, pP. 595-617.
The Chancery Practice Amendment Act, 1852 (is & 16 Vict., c. 86),

114S-47.
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tion, by eliminating pleadings in equity and sub-tituting for them
a simple summons to appear and show cause, and by permitting
the application to be dealt with in chambers instead of requiring
it to go into the trial list and wait its turn for disposition. This
was undoubtedly a great improvement, but it left the latter half
of the abuse untouched; the judge could still make no other order
than one for the general administration of the whole estate in
chancery. He could not hear argument on the claim of one distributee and order payment made; he could only order that the
entire estate be paid into court and there inquired into in the manner described. The theory was, of course, that while at law a
creditor might previously have sued and collected his entire claim
irrespective of the total assets in hand, the Chancellor, more tender in conscience, would make no payments until he felt certain
that the distribution would be fair to all concerned. Where proceedings were hostile, therefore, even with the new facilities offered by the summons in chambers, an order for administration
tied up the entire estate for an indefinite period. To be sure, there
were many cases where the trouble was not actually contentious,-an executor might simply wish to get the court's protection, or
its opinion on the propriety of a payment or sale; in that case he
was obliged to arrange with the beneficiaries to file a bill in equity
against them to which they would put in an answer, thus raising
the point in question on the pleadings. Having obtained a decision on it at a preliminary stage, the executor would then stay
the proceedings, pay the costs out of the estate, and act upon the
interpretation of his duties so obtained. When the first Judicature Act was passed, that was the situation with regard to the
administration not only of the estates of decedents but of trusts
of every kind. In cases of doubt or dissatisfaction the only
course open to the court was to take over the entire trust. Such
an evil was rendered all the more acute by the enormous quantity
of property which, in England, is held in trust either under wills
or marriage settlements.
No change was made in the procedure in Chancery chambers
by the 1875 Rules. all such practice being preserved by the clause
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in the Act saving existing procedure not expressly superseded.
But the subject was given close attention when the Chancery Orders on chamber work were consolidated into the Rules in 1883,
and the most difficult work of the draftsmen of the 1883 Revision
Act in selecting parts of statutes to be repealed, was to separate
the sections to be moulded into new Rules from the sections so
clearly obsolete as to warrant deletion. Curiously enough one of
the sections which they considered belonged in the latter class was
that portion of the Act of 1852 whose operation has just been
described; so unsatisfactory was the result it drew after its application-the throwing into Chancery of the entire estate-that
its use had been resorted to only in rare instances. When the
Lord Chancellor, who examined the revision bill with the same
painstaking care he bestowed upon the drafts of the new Rules,
came upon that section in the draft submitted to him for approval,
he was struck by the fact that a provision containing possibilities
for good should have fallen into disuse, and decided to withhold
the section from the repealing act until he could consult with the
two expert advisers of the Rule Committee on matters of chancery procedure, Sir George Jessel and Sir Edward Fry. The
M,aster of the Rolls was emphatic in declaring that the procedure
tinder the old- Act was worth reviving and that it could be improved upon by giving the court power to decide the specific point
raised in any single-summons without ordering an administration of the whole estate in court. Mr. Justice Fry concurred in
this view and, at Lord Selborne's request, drew up a set of Rules
to carry out the new suggestion; they form the nucleus of Order
Thus was born
IV, on Procedure at Chancery Chambers.
'' 0 2 whose growth has completely
tae "originating summons,
transformed the work of the Chancery Division.
Of the ten heads of equitable jurisdiction, cases arising under which are specifically assigned to the Chancery Division by
§21

of th* Judicature Act, 875.

In an ordirMry action a "summons" is a notice that some interlocutory
application wilt be made, so it can never issue until after writ. In the cases
,%here the new summons is permissible, it is not preceded by a writ, therefore
it is said to "ignate" the proceeding
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the Judicature Act, 303 two are selected in the new Rules as the
proper departments within which the new procedure is to operate.
All questions arising in the administration o!c any decedent's estate
or of any trust, which before 1883 would have been the proper
subjects of an administration action,3 0 4 may now be raised by
simply issuing a summons which states the nature of the relief
required and enumerates the parties and interests affected thereby.
All necessary parties are served and must be represented either
individually or by classes when the matter comes up for the hearing in chambers. At the first meeting the applicant will present
to the master the evidence in support of his application, in affidavit form; if the matter is such that the respondents have cause
to object, the master will order them to file their evidence on
affidavit and fix a time within which they shall do so; he may
also allow the other side to file evidence in reply, and if necessary
there may be cross-examination either before the judge in court,
with his consent, or before one of the official e-xaminers. When
all the evidence is before the master he will make an order thereon,
granting the relief prayed for or refusing it, except in those cases
which, by the Rules or by the personal orders of the judges, must
be dealt with by the judge in person. The master's decision, too, is
subject to review by the judge to whose chambers he is attached.
§34 of the Judicature Act, 1873. It provides that there shall be assigned
to the Chancery Division all causes and matters for any of the following
purposes:
i. The administration of the estates of deceased persons.
2. The dissolution of partnerships, or the taking of partnership or other
accounts.
3. The redemption or foreclosure of mortgages.
4. The raising of portions, or other charges on land.
S. The sale and distribution of the proceeds of property subject to any
lien or charge.
6. The execution of trusts, charitable or private.
7. The rectification, or setting aside, or cancellation of deeds or other
written instruments.
8. The specific performance of contracts between vendors and purchasers of real estates, including contracts for leases.
9. The partition or sale of real estates.
io. The wardship of infants and the care of infants' esttes.
' In i885 the subject of redemption and foreclosure of mortgages was
added, and later that of infants' estates. Proceedings under k variety of
statutes are also directed to be begun by originating summons. These include
especially the Trustee Act, 1893; the Settled Land Acts, i88a to x8go; the
Lunacy Acts, i8go and i9ni; the Land Transfer Act, 1891, and the Finance
Act, 1894.
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The entire proceeding will frequently be concluded within a
very short period (unless unforeseen delays or difficulties arise)
and the point decided "without the tedious and often unnecessary
accounts and inquiries which were almost invariably directed by
30 5
an administration decree or order under the old practice.1
In this manner a very large proportion of matters disposed
of by the Chancery Division are dealt with.30 6 It suffices in
every case where either there is no dispute but merely 4 desire
'to take the opinion of the court, and in all cases where there is
a dispute and the issue is so clear that pleadihgs would be unnecessary, The former class form numerically the larger of
the two; it was said of matters to be disposed of by the originating summons, when its new form was developed, "The characteristic circumstance is that the claims, though open to contest, are in fact so little seriously contested, that the exercise of
the jurisdiction presents the appearance rather of the mere
administration of business than of the exercise of compulsory
powers."' 0 7 , But the contentious matters are also numerous, and
this method of dealing with them in chambers without the expense of pleadings or the delay of waiting for trial has caused
the originating summons to grow steadily in the favor of that
large portion of the English public whose interest in the proper
administration of trust funds and property is intimate and sometimes pressing.
Perhaps the most interesting development of the originating
summons came in 1893, when it was made possible for "any
person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other
written instrument," to issue one "for the determination of any
question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a
declaration of the rights of the persons interested." 30 8 This Rule
was framed to 'facilitate the determination of short questions of
Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England (2nd ed., London, i9o6), vol. 2,
p. 64. tit. Chambers, Chancery Division.
'"In 1912 there were begun in the Chancery Division two thousand five
hundred and thirty-seven proceedings by ordinary writ and two thousand
eight hundred and nineteen by originating summons.
S27 SOLIcrrORS' JOURVAL, 664 (August 4, t883).
' Order LIV A, Rule i.
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construction which can be examined, without affidavits, upon the
instrument itself,30 9 and it is not confined to cases where an action might be brought in respect of the instrument.3 10
This concludes the review of' the revision of 1883. The
innovations that stand out highest are the insertion of the summons for directions and the development of the originating summons, both emphasizing the importance of the work done at
chambers. Those who look for general tendencies will note that
three influences make themselves felt ll through the codification. The first, and the one most foreign to the spirit of procedure at common law, is the continued increase of official control over the conduct of actions, as opposed to free liberty for
the litigants to do as they see fit. This is manifested not only
in the complete control over the progress of an action vested in
the master before trial, and at trial in the judge, but in the
right of the Taxing Masters, at the conclusion of the controversy, to exercise their discretion in disallowing the costs of
steps unnecessarily or negligently taken. Every application in
the course of an action is considered by the officers of the court
not in the abstract, but in relation to the subject-matter of the
action, and their leave is a prerequisite to all but a very few
steps that can be taken. The second influence represents a
reversal of the common law practice in an opposite direction. In
the early days of the King's courts pleadings were intended to
inform the court of the exact issues between the parties; the
refinements of pleAding grew up on the court's passive willingness to let issues emerge out of the allegations recited to it by
contending pleaders in antiphonal rivalry, and the stilted form
which written pleadings eventually assumed was born of the
tradition of care with which every statement in one's opponent's
pleading had to be met to the court's satisfaction without disclosing to that opponent too much of one's own case: Today
the prime function of pleadings is to give the parties mutually
full information as to the number and nature of the issues to be
heard at trial. The game is now played with the cards on the
table. A party is entitled to know before he comes into court
'"Re Nobbs [1896],
"'

2 Ch. 830.
Mason v. Schuppisser, 8i LAW TImES REPORTS, 147 (1899).
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with his witnesses the full extent of the case he must prove; and
what is more important, he is entitled to*know his opponent's
line of attack sufficiently early in the litigation to decide whether
or not it will be worth while to fight it out to trial. This fendency
finds expression in the 1883 Rules in the increased power of the
master to order, and of the parties to choose, that pleadings be
dispensed with where the issues are clear, that when given they
should contain full particulars, and that mutual discovery should
be directed specifically to the parts of the case that will develop
issues. The whole aim is to require the parties to give each
other all the necessary infornation without superfluous parleying. The third tendency is the decided bettering in the malleability of judgments. Instead of the old blunderbuss judgment
deciding the whole litigation in favor of one side or the other,
the court is now able to select issues and parties carefully from
the entanglements of a modern business transaction and so to
frame its judgment as to reach each interest individually and
completely. This is aided in the Rules of 1883 by increased
facilities for the severing of claims undefended and parties not
defending from those in contest, for dealing finally with third
parties whose liability is established in the original action, for the
raising of counter-claims, and for weeding out the issues and
parties in any action in respect of whom the opening of judginent or the granting of retrial would be just.
None of these three influences began with the Rules of 1883,
which merely followed along the lines laid down in the Schedule
to the Act of 1875. Indeed, together with the decline of trial
by jury, they may be regarded as the distinctive contribution of
the Judicature Acts towards the reform of civil procedure and the
attainment of the ideal when civil process instead of being, in
the words of Lord Brougham, "a two-edged sword in the hands
of craft and oppression," will become "the staff of honesty and
the shield of innocence."

IX.
Since 1883
been effected by
Supreme Court.
adjective law of

no complete revision of the code of Rules has
the Rule Committee, so that the "Rules of the
1883," with their amendments, still express the
practice in the Supreme Court. Those amend-
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ments, however, are by no means small either in number or in
importance. The Rule Committee has constantly endeavored to
meet the wishes not only of the profession but of all parties interested, in altering inconvenient or inadequate portions of the
Rules, so that not a year has passed since 1883 without the addition of a body of amendments to the Rules already in force. So
frequently do changes come that the annotated editions of the
Rules used by practitioners appear annually, and each year's book
is somewhat bulkier than the last.'"' The amendments vary from
a short sentence intended to explain a doubtful phrase to whole
Orders creating new methods of procedure. Three times, in i885,
1893 and i9o2, the Committee has, for special reasons, promulgated especially large batches of amendments, over one hundred
and fifty Rules having been altered or added by the changes in
those years alone; in some years only one or two Rules have been
affected. Altogether nearly five hundred Rules have been altered
or added since 1883.
It must not be supposed that this prolific activity has been
viewed altogether with satisfaction by either the profession or
the lay public. Every change in the Rules calls forth some protest. However eager some persons may be to persuade the Rule
Committee to act upofi their suggestions, others always raise
their voices to let things stand as they are. It is left entirely to
the Committee's discretion to balance the conveniences, and
there is no doubt that for every suggestion it has followed it has
rejected several, perhaps half a dozen, others. The fact is that
new situations constantly arise which, if they were not provided
for, would leave the Rules incomplete or inconclusive, so that
the frequency of amendment appears to be a necessary evil.
. An examination of the amendments made since 1883 reveals the fact that they were produced in response to a series of
impelling causes whose wide variety bears testimony to the great
adaptability and responsiveness of a procedure so contained. To
trace the principal movements or concerted efforts for reform
which they represent, the time from x883 to the present may be
'

From z875 to 1888 there appeared seven successive editions of Wilson:
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conveniently divided into three parts, the most prominent episode in each of which was the issue of a set of Rules more numerous than those published in the average year. The three divisions center about 1885, 1893 and i9o2.

The chief work of the Rule Committee in the first of these
three periods was to introduce changes to reform chamber procedure in the Chancery Division of the High Court. The 1875
Rules did not extend to chancery practice, and in 1883 little
more was done than to codify the scattered provisions of all the
old Chancery Orders and statutes. But the development of the
originating summons made chamber procedure in the .Chancery
Division a subject of the very first importance, and Lord Selborne determined to have it gone into and revised with the same
thoroughness he had applied to the practice on the common law
side through his Procedure Committee of 188i and the subsequent revision.312 In 1884, about a year after the R. S. C. 1883
had gone into effect, he appointed a committee of ten "to inquire
into the subject of the existing rules as to.the distribution of
business in the courts and chambers of the Chancery Division,
and the distribution of the clerical staff," at the head of which
he placed Lord Esher, the Master of the Rolls.313 That comjudicature Acts and Rules. begun by Mr. (now the Rt. Hon. Sir) Arthur
Wilson and carried on by him and others. In 1884 Mr. Thomas Snow began
the Annual Practice, an annotated edition of the Judicature Acts and Rules,
commonly known, from the color of its covers, as the White Book. It has
appeared annually since that year, gradually growing in size; the 1914 edition
contains over twenty-seven hundred pages. In i899 an annual publication,
which now rivals the White Book for popularity, was begun, called the Yearly
Practice, or, colloquially, the Red Book. Its chief editor was Mr. M. J.
Muir Mackenzie, one of the Official Referees; he was a joint editor of the
Wilson book during its lifetime. The 1914 Red Book contains over twentyfive hundred pages. Both the White Book and the Red Book give copious
annotations for every section of the Acts and Rules, citing thousands of
decided cases.
' It will be remembered that Lord Selborne's Legal Procedure Committee of z88x was restricted, in its investigations and recommendations, to procedure in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court.
'The other members were Mr. (later Lord) Justice Kay, Mr. Justice
Pearson, Mr. J. (later Mr. Justice) Stirling, Mr. M. Ingle (now Mr.
Justice) Joyce, Mr. Horace (later Lord) Davey, Q. C., Mr. Frank (now
the Rt. Hon. Sir Francis) Mowatt, C. B., Mr. (now Sir) Kenneth Muir
Mackenzie, Mr. Henry Roscoe and Mr. Thomas Marshall At the time of
its appointment, therefore, the Committee contained three judges, three barristers, two solicitors, one lay member of the civil service, and the Lord
Chancellor's Secretary.
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mittee, which became known as the Chancery Chambers .Committee, heard evidence during November and December, 1884, from
judges, registrars, taxing masters and chief clerks in the Chancery Division, and also from prominent solicitors engaged in
chancery work. The Incorporated Law Society laid before the
Committee a series of recommendations advocating the simplifying of the method of drawing up orders in chambers. 3 1 ' On
August 7, 1885, the Committee signed a Report for transmission to the Lord Chancellor together with a set of Resolutions
proposing definite additions to the R. S. C. and changes in the
organization of the Chancery Division.'31
Principal among the conclusions it submitted was one favoring a re-arrangement of chancery work which would assure to
witness actions a favorable opportunity of continuous and unbroken hearing. That touched what had been the greatest obstacle to the prompt handling of chancery actions. It must be
understood that the average action on the chancery side involves
not only the hearing of issues, with or without witnesses, by the
judge sitting in open court, but a considerable amount of chamber work in the course of which all preliminary or interlocutory
applications are disposed of and decrees worked out after they
are handed down; it is in chambers, rather than in coilrt, that the
distinctive machinery of the Chancery Division is seen in operation, performing the equitable administration and distribution of
assets. It was the custom to assign each action in that Division
to one of the five judges in it, who would thereafter have complete seisin of all proceedings in the action, and chamber applications in it would be heard by his own staff of clerks, acting as
deputies for him. Frequently, however, parties, dissatisfied with
the decision of the judge's chief clerk, would wish to have it reviewed by the judge himself; again, certain important chamber
matters were reserved for the decision of the judge in person.
For these cases the judge would have personally to sit in chain"'These are enumerated in 29 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 773 (October 17,
1885).
"The Report was ordered printed by the House of Commons, March 29,
z886, and appears in Parl. Pap. 1886. LIII. 127; also in full in 3o SoLicrTor'
JOURNAL, 518, S

(1886).
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bers. To get time to do his chamber work, which was alwa, s'
heavy, a judge would either have to sit after four in the afternoon, wearied by a whole day of trial work in court, or simply
cancel the trial work and sit for whole days exclusively in chambers. The latter course was the one most followed, with the result that there would frequently be breaks of several weeks together in the hearing of each judge's trial list of witness actions.
Consequently it often happened that witnesses and parties were
hung up for weeks at a time, without knowing just when they
would be called upon to appear. How troublesome and expensive such delays were it is easy to understand.
What the Committee proposed was to appoint an additional
judge to the Division, and then divide the six judges up into
three sets of two each; each pair of judges would be given the
power to handle actions assigned to either of them, and they
would so arrange their time that while one sat in court the other
sat in chambers; every week or month they would change about.
There would thus be established in the Chancery Division three
sub-Divisions, in each of which there woild always be both a
chamber judge and a court judge continually sitting. This plan,
known as the "linked judge system," and adopted by the Chancery Chambers Committee after lengthy discussion of several
expedients submitted tb it with the same end in view, was first
devised by Horace Davey, Q. C., one of the barrister members
of the Committee, who later, as Lord Davey, sat in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. Its approval and subsequent
adoption by the Rule Committee (though not until many years
later 316 ) enabled the judges in the Chancery Division so to clear
off their arrears of work that to the present day that branch of
the High Court, long notorious for its unconscionable delays,
has always kept completely abreast of its trial lists and left far
behind its former reputation for apathy and neglect.
Subjoined to the Report of the Committee was a series of
Resolutions containing suggestions for minor improvements in
the procedure before the chief clerks in chancery chambers and
before the taxing masters. Most of these were adopted verbatim
"'

Order V, Rule 9 A, November, igoo.
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by the Rule Committee and issued as new Rules in 1885. 317 Some
useful changes they introduced were that accounts might be
vouched in the offices of solicitors, only items for surcharge or
contest being brought into chambers, 318 and that the court might
stay proceedings brought to demand an account from an executor or trustee, to give the respondent time to file the missing account and so save costs.3 19 Two of the new Rules, at least, trace
back to the recommendations submitted to the Chancery Chambers Committee by the Law Society in 1884; one allowing counsel to be briefed to appear at the hearing of important application's in chambers ;120 and another requiring all orders made in
chambers to be drawn up by the chief clerk himself, except those
to be acted on by the Paymaster.32 1 An innovation introduced
by the Rule Committee apparently on its own initiative was to
extend the originating summons to proceedings on foreclosure
and redemption of mortgages; these have now become a very
large proportion of the instances in which the originating summons is applied.32 2 The R. S. C. 1885 also ihcluded eight Rules
on procedure before the taxing masters, 23 and nine Rules to
unify the three or four methods of appeal previously in use from
inferior courts to the High Court.
Another peculiarity of the distribution of duties in the
Chancery Division that came in for close attention soon after
1883 was the relation between the functions of the chief clerks
and those of the registrars. The office of a chief clerk has been
described above -,hesits in the chambers of the judge to whom he
is attached, to dispose of all applications made to the judge which
"'TheR. S. C. 1885 may be found in 30 Souciroas' JouitN,4 x43 (December 26, 1885). They contain fifty Rules, of which thirty-two are taken
from the Resolutions of the Chancery Chambers Committee.
' Order
XXXIII, Rule 4 A, from Resolution 38 of the Report.
"Order LV, Rule io A, from Resolution 39 of the Report.
'Order
LV, Rule i A, from Resolution 2o of the Report This put an
end to the diversities of practice at chambers amongst the various chancery
judges.
' Order LV, Rules 74 and 74 A, from Resolution 28 of the Report. Previously every order of a chief clerk had to be formally drawn up by the
Registrars, just as is now done with judgments rendered m open court.
'Order LV, Rule 5 A.
' Order LXV, Rules i9 A to H, from Resolution 40 of the Report. Most
of these were altered, however, in x88.
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do not have to be made in open court; a few matters are excepted from his powers, either by the Rules or by the judge's personal direction, and must be heard by the judge in person. Two
chief clerks are attached to each Chancery judge, and each chief
clerk has under him a staff of subordinate clerks who do all the
clerical work involved in the accounts and inquiries which form
so large a part of the business in chambers. The chief clerk is
a sort of deputy for the judge, so that orders made by him are
supposed to be made by the judge himself. Dissatisfied parties
may ask the judge to review his chief clerk's decision by merely
"adjourning the summons" to be heard by the judge. The judge
will not as a rule, however, vary his chief clerk's certificate, as
each chief clerk knows pretty well how his judge will act; if he
is in doubt, he will of his own motion adjourn the summons to
the judge. Since 1897, the chief clerks are styled "masters,"
though no change whatsoever in their duties was made by the
change in title. The registrars, on the other hand, are officers
whose duty it is to draw up the orders and judgments pronounced
by the court. There are twelve registrars, and each one sits each
day in a different court either in the Chancery Division or in the
Court of Appeal, according to a rota. Decrees in the Chancery
Division are far more complicated than the judgments on the
common law side, and require to be drawn up with great precision, having regard to all the interests affected-for instance, in
the distribution of a fund-and to all the documents and facts
upon which the court is moved to act. "It may look .toan outsider a curious thing," said a witness, before the 1884 Chancery Chambers Committee, "that an order of the court should
be a complicated matter, but I know few things that are more
complicated.

.

.

.

The registrars are a body of men trained

up from their youth in orders." When the order is one pronounced in open court the registrar bases his draft on his own
notes and on the information furnished him by the opposing
solicitors, who must appear before him for that purpose. If iis one delivered in chambers, the registrar draws it up from thmaster's notes.32-4 Another witness explained, before the Com"See Daniell: Chancery Practice (8th ed., 1914), voL i, c. xv, "Judg.
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mittee: "In all orders made on proceedings in chambers the
materials are supplied by the chief clerk (master) and the forin
is supplied by the registrar.

.

.

.

The chief clerk's note for

the order may be about twenty words, and the order may be
about fifty folios." Besides these two classes of semi-judicial
officers there is a third whose powers are equally great-the taxing masters. As their title indicates, they have the power to ratify bills of costs delivered at the conclusion of a controversy,
to cut down charges made or to strike out items, and to protect
parties from overcharging by either their own solicitors or their
opponents'. Formerly there were separate taxing masters for
each Division of the High Court, but in 1902 they were all consolidated into one office which performs the taxation for all Divisions, the work being distributed among twelve masters ac3
cording to a rota.

25

One of the Resolutions of the Chancery Chambers Committee proposed that there should be some effort to do away with
the distinctions between these three classes of officers in the
Chancery Division, but the only action in that direction taken by
the Rule Committee in I885 was to order that thereafter the
chief clerks should themselves draw up most of the chamber orders instead of sending them to the registrars. In May, 1887,
Lord Halsbury, was persuaded to appoint a committee to consider a possible amalgamation of the officers of registrar, chief
clerk and taxing- master in the Chancery Division,3 26 but the report of that committee only brought out the inadvisability of any
such amalgamation. The technical training required for the registrar's work was the strongest argument against throwing his
duties on to the chief clerk; and the impartiality necessary in
a taxing master showed how unwise it would be to give his
powers to the chief clerk. Mr. Justice Pearson testified before
the 1884 Committee:
ments and Orders ;" also article on "Registrars," in Encyclopaedia of the Laws
of England. It ought to be mentioned that these "notes are important, in
the absence of stenographic reports of proceedings.
'The
chief clerks (masters) in judges' chambers and the taxing masters
are always ex-solicitors; the registrars are drawn from the Bar. The salary
of all three offices is about iiSoo per annum.
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"It is, in my judgment, a great advantage that the tax:ing
masters are entirely separated from all matters, in respect of
which they have to tax bills of costs, in their earlier stages.
They are thus kept independent and impartial, and no solicitor
need fear their being prejudiced by any opinion they have
formed in the progress of the litigation."
In 1889 there occurred an event which throws an interesting side-light on the way new Rules can be adapted to pressing
circumstances by the rule-making authority. In May of that
year, Mr. Justice Kay, who was well known for his disposition
to cut down the costs allowed to solicitors wherever possible, was
a member of the Rule Committee and procured the passage of'
the following addition to the Order on costs:327
"If, in any case in which a taxation is directeu with a view
to the payment of the costs out of a fund or estate (real or personal), or out of the assets of a company in liquidation, the
costs shall have been increased by unnecessary delay, or by improper, vexatious or unnecessary proceedings, or by other misconduct or negligence, or if from any other cause the amount
of the costs shall, in the opinion of the taxing master, be excessive, having regard to the value of the fund, estate, or assets to
which they relate, or other circumstances, the taxing master
shall allow only such an amount of costs as would, in his opinion,
have been incurred if the litigation had been properly conducted,
and shall assess the same at a gross sum, and shall (if necessary) apportion the amount among the parties."
This was an attack upon the solicitors too ob~'ious to permit
of its being overlooked, and on May 17, 1889, a meeting of solicitors at the Law.Society passed a resolution "that the Council
be requested to take immediate steps for obtaining a suspension,
pending a revision, of the Orders of May, 1889." A week later
the Council presented a report protesting strongly against the
arbitrary wording of the new Rule. They said: "If the words
of the regulation do not in terms preclude an appeal, they practically- make an appeal impossible, place the taxing master in a
'The
Committee was composed of Mr. (now Sir) Kenneth Muir
Mackenzie, the Lord Chancellor's Secretary; L. L Pemberton, a registrar;
Charles Burney, a chief clerk; John V. Longbourne, a taxing master; and
t%.uo others. Its report has never been published.
'¢ Order LXV, Rule 27 (38 A), to establish the practice approved of in
Brown v. Burdett, 40 Ch. Div. 244 C. A. (1888).
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position of irresponsibility unknown to any other tribunal in the
country, and override all Acts of Parliament, rules of court and
A few weeks later3 29 the Rule Committee, imdecisions. ' 32'
pressed by the intensity of the opposition it had aroused, but still
convinced that the regulation was right in principle, issued an
amendment striking out the words "in his opinion" from the
body of the Rule, and .dding to its end:
"The provisions as to the review of taxation shall apply to
allowances and certificates under this Rule,"
thereby acceding to the solicitors' demand for a right of appeal.
In 1902 the Rule was extended to apply to any taxation, instead of only to cases where costs are payable out of a fund. It
is liberally interpreted, however, and its application has not been
frequent enough, since its author's death, to be a source of active worry to practitioners.
Two statutes passed near the end of this first period had an
important effect on practice in the High Court-the County
Courts Act, 1888, and the Arbitration Act, 1889. The former
consolidates Acts providing for the remission from the High
Court to a County Court of practically all actions where the sum
in dispute is under £oo;330 the latter prescribes the procedure
to be followed in arbitrations and in putting in contest the suf3 1
ficiency or validity of arbitrators' awards.
X.
The second period, from 189o to 1897, was marked by the
issue of an important set of new Rules in 1893, the enactment of
several statutes altering the constitution of the rule-making
authority, the creation of a commercial court by the judges themselves without the aid of either Parliament or the Rule Committee, and an attempt (which failed of completion) to introduce a
revision of the code formed by the R. S. C. 1883 and their numerous amendments.
'

The full report appears in 33 SoLIcIToRs' JOURNAL, 495 (June 1, 1880).
'June 24, i8 8 9
"51 & 52 Vict., c. 41. The limit was raissed from £5o to £oo by an

amendment in 1903.
'n52 & 53 Vict, C. 49.
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Over one hundred Rules had, by i89o , been added to The
original text of 1883 or subjected to some alteration; in addition,
successive Judicature Acts, in 1884, 1887, i888 and i89o, had
patched up small leaks in the previous ones, so that the old inconvenience of having to search in a dozen places for the correct
practice was once more felt and, as before, gave rise to agitation
for a revision of the Rules. In February, i89o, Mr. Thomas
Snow, the founder of the "Annual Practice" (the White Book),
and then its editor, addressed a letter to the Council of Judges
pointing out that one-fifth of the sections of the Judicature Act,
1873, had been replaced, altered or suspended, that nearly all the
thirty-five sections of the Judicature Act, 1875, had been amended
or repealed, wholly or in part, and that about ten of the twentyfive sections of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, had been
aimilarly dealt with.3 3 2 He suggested there should be a codification of all the Acts on judicature, with a view to placing all the
sections on court organization in one Act, and all those on jurisdiction and procedure in another; to accompany this he urged
the necessity for a revision of all the Rules of Court, citing the
fact that over four thousand decisions had been handed down
upon them since their birth. What impression was made on the
rule-making body by this letter does not appear to be recorded.
A few months later, in April, Mr. Snow, full of -his subject,
wrote again, confining himself this time to pointing out contradictions in the Rules made by the Committee for the operation of
the new Arbitration Act, I889.-33
No sign was given by the
Rule Committee in response to this, as to its attitude on the question, but on July 17, I89O, Lord- Esher, the Master of the Rolls,
one of the eight judges who then composed the Committee,
moved in the House of Lords for a Commission to look into the
administration of the law tder the Judicature Acts. He laid
especial emphasis upon the abuse of summonses for discovery
and interrogatories, the old trouble that had been complained of
to Lord Selborne's Committee as far back as 188I. Although he
The substance of the letter is quoted in 34 SoLicIroRS' JOURNAL,
(February i5, 189o).
"The letter appears in full in 25 LAW JOURNAL, 698 (May 3, x89o).
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was supported in his argument by Lord Herschell, the motion
was dropped upon the opposition of the Lord Chancellor (Lord
Halsbury), who expressed the view that the Rule Committee had
ample powers to make any necessary changes. 334 In spite of
this assurance, no action was taken, and in the Lower House,
nearly a year later, Mr. Atherley-Jones had an evening set aside
to discuss a similar motion, but it failed to attract a quorum. 3 5
Though nothing came of these formal efforts to get sofnething done the judges were obviously restless under the constant
criticism of their failure to improve matters, and in December of
1891 Lord Justice Bowen and Mr. Justice Mathew, whose vigor
and enterprise had considerably enlivened the work of the i88i
Procedure Committee of which both had been members, addressed a letter to Lord Coleridge calling his attention to many
points in the working of the judicature system which were in
need of investigation and amendment. The Lord Chief Jus33
tice, in turn, in a correspondence which was later made public,
emphasized anew to the Lord Chancellor the need for action
which was earlier asked for by Lord Esher in Parliament, and
pointed out that the proper course would be to call together a
Council of all the judges, under Section seventy-five of the Act
of 1873, without further delay. To this Lord Halsbury assented
and he ultimately fixed on June as the most convenient time for
the meeting. Although the Act requires that an annual Council
should be held, .no such meeting had been called since 1884, so
that the section was (and is today) practically a dead letter and
the judges were not expected to accomplish very much under its
auspices.-3 But more things seem to happen when not very much
is expected.
The debate is reported in Hansard, 3rd ser., vol. 347, cols. 32-65 (189o).
His Honour Judge Atherley-Jones, K. C., Judge of the City of
London Court. A speech favoring the motion was prepared by Mr. PittLewis, Q. C., but never delivered. It appears in 9! LAw TimEs, 122 (June
'3, 1891).
It appears in 92 LAw TIMEs, 163 (January 9, 1892).
S"36 SOLICIToRs' JOURNAL, 158 (January 9, 1892): "Probably the true
'

"Now

remedy for the present state of things in the Supreme Court is to be found

in another direction entirely. . . . It would be an obvious reform to place
the management of its business under the control of a Minister of Justice,
less ornamental but more useful than the Lord Chancellor, who would be
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There was no lack of material for the Cotincil to work upon.
During the five months before it met there were submitted to it
resolutions from the Law Society and the Bar Committee and
suggestions from many individuals. In February Mr. Snow once
more sent to the judges a communication strongly advocating a
complete revision of the Rules and giving specific examples of
weak spots that ought to be repaired, 3 8 quoting Lord CampbeU's
expression that "the due distribution of justice depends much
more upon the rules by which suits are conducted than on the perfection of the code by which rights are defined." A small committee of judges, appointed to draft resolutions upon which the full
Council could agree, drew up one hundred and one resolutions
covering all the reforms being asked for, and some of the judges
wrote out lengthy criticism of these Resolutions which were also
39
laid before the Council.8
For three days, the seventeenth, the twenty-first and the
twenty-third of June, 1892, the Council in formal meeting considered and debated all these recommendations and concluding
by adopting a series of one hundred Resolutions advocating
changes in the arrangement and conduct of the High Court's
business.3 40 The Report includes comment on and definite proposals for changes in the circuit system, interlocutory applications for discovery and judgment, fixing of place of trial, creation of a commercial court, chamber work in the Chancery Division, taxation and payment of costs, and the allowing of appeals.
Many of these are taken from the recommendations made by the
Law Society in March-a fresh evidence of the keen and intelligent interest the solicitors as a body have always taken in the re-

responsible for its due conduct to Parliament." An interesting advocacy by
Mr. Thomas Snow of the creation of a Ministry of Justice appears also in
16 LAw QuARmmLY REVIEW, 129 (igoo)-.
mPrinted in 27 LAW JoURNAL,I104 (February 6, 1892). He also published an article in 8 LAW QUARTELmy REVIEW, 129 (892), in which he de-

veloped a boldly original scheme for an entire reorganization of the judicature.
.Those

(1892).

of Mr. Justice Cave are printed in 93 LAW TI MEs, 375, 402

'"They appear in full in 36 SoLIcIroRs' JOUR.AL, 716 (August 13, 1892).
For an account of Lord Bowen's work upon these resolutions, see his "Life,
by Sir H. S. Cunningham (London, x897), p. i73.
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form of procedure.' 4 1 On the whole, ,the Report vas received
with great favor in legal circles 3 42 and the breadth of its scope
was regarded as testifying to the desire of the Bench as a whole
tomaintain the efficiency of every department of the court's procedure. But no mention was made in it of the codification of already existing Acts and Rules for which there was such a strong
4
demand, and this omission was adversely criticized. 3
Before Lord Halsbury could make any use of this Report the
general election of 1892 retired his party from office and Lord
Herschell resumed his place on the woolsack. His return opened
up a period of real activity in the progress of procedural reform.
He first asked the Bar Committee and the Council of the Law
Society to give him an official expression of -the views of the two
branches of the profession on the Report of the judges. By the
close of the year these were in his hands3 44 and he was able to
submit to the Rule Committee a definite program for the formulation of new Rules, based on the advice of the judges and
elaborated by the technical criticisms of solicitors and barristers
in active practice. Discussion in the Committee continued over
several months and at length, soon after the close of the Long
Vacation, in November, 1893, a batch of over sixty Rules was
signed and published, carrying into effect many of the reforms
which had been under consideration. In the main the Rules of
' t At the Annual .Provincial Meeting of the Incorporated Law Society at
Norwich in 1892 no less than three speeches were made analyzing the Report
of the Council of Judges, and comparing it with the recommendations submitted by the Law Society in 1882 and x892. They are printed in 36
SoLIcIToRs' JOURNAL, 8O5 (Mr. Richard Pennington, President), 813 (Mr. John
Hunter), and 8x5 (Mr. E. K. Blyth).
' Articles from the Saturday Review, the Liverpool Post, the Dublin
Freeman's Journal, the Notts Guardian, and the Glasgow Herald are reprinted
in 93 LAw TIMEs, 43o (September 17, 1892).
'See articles on "The Judges' Report on Practice," in 8 Law QUtx.TERLY REVIEw, 289 (182).

report from the Bar appears in 94 LAw Trmus, 183 (December
JOURNAL, 159 (January 7, 1893). This effort at coaperation was characteristic of Lord Herschell's attitude toward the subject, and was appreciated. A writer in 37
SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 57 (November 26, 1892) said: "The request shows that
we have now got a Lord Chancellor who jrecognizes that the criticisms of
both branches of the profession are of value with regard to a scheme framed
by judges, and who may be relied on to consider and give full weight to
every reasonable suggestion."
'The

24, 1892) ; that from the Law Society in 37 SoLIcIToRS'
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November, 1893, deal with six topics, all of which figured in
the discussions of the Council of Judges. They are the service
of process outside the jurisdiction, summary judgment in liquidated claims, the summons for directions, discovery, originating
summonses, and the curtailment *ofpleadings.
As to the first, the power of English judges to order service
of writs outside the jurisdiction was extended to include 6riginating summonses.3 4 5 When this became known, the Scotch
members in the House of Commons, for some reason, thought
it a reflection on their Scotch courts that domiciled Scotchmen
should be liable to be made involuntary parties to litigatiori in
England. In point of fact, the new Rule simply extended a
recognized practice, and applied equally not only to Scotland but
to all places outside England. But the Scotch members plied
the Front Bench with questions until on January 1I,

1894, the

Rule Committee issued a new Rule marked "urgent" annulling
the 1893 Rule on service of originating summonses out of the
jurisdiction, and it has never been reinstated.
The procedure on recovery of summary judgment on liquidated claims was rendered more flexible by making it possible
for a plaintiff to strike out of his writ any claims which, on the
hearing, appear to be improperly classed as liquidated;346 and
the procedure was made highly effective by the creation of a new
trial list, known as the "Short Cause List," 347 on which short
actions for summary- judgment can be placed and disposed of at
once if a trial is necessary. The success of that list proves that
nothing will so completely take the heart out of the average
defence in an action where the claim is for a liquidated amount
as the prospect of an immediate trial. In considerably more
than half the cases which fall into this category defendants of
recent years, though entering appearance, have failed to apply
for leave to defend. The summons for directions was extended
to all actions except those assigned to the Chancery Division, but.
Order XI. The R. S. C., 1893, are printed in full in 38 SoLCrrOs'
(December z,1893).

JOURNAL, 72

'"Order XIV, Rule I (b).
"Order XIV, Rule 8 (b).
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it wvas still left optional.34 8 It was not until 1897 that it was
made compulsory and extended over chancery actions as well. 349
:Interlocutory applications, especially for leave to obtain discovery of documents and to administer interrogatories, had
always, since 1875, been the bUtenoire of -procedure reformers
and the new regulations made in Order XXXI by the R. S. C.
-1893 seem to be the most satisfactory arrangement that could
be arrived at, since they have remained unaltered ever since.
The principal change they made is that, though interrogatories
may be delivered in any case, the leave of a master must first be
obtained and he must approve the specific questions to be asked;
he may, if he considers proper, alter their number, extent or
form. 3 0 Discovery of documents was made less of a burden to
suitors by a new provision that where the documents to be inspected are business books or entries verified copies will suffice,
provided mention is made in the affidavit of any erasures, interlineations or alterations in the original. On another point, it
was always the rule (as it is now) that the "affidavit of documents," stating in separate schedules what relevant papers a party
possesses and for which of them he claims privilege from inspection, is "conclusive"--that is, that the party's opponent must
accept it as true and cannot cross-examine upon it. But that
conclusiveness was made less formidable by two new Rules of
1893, one of which allows the master to order a party to state
whether he has or had any specific document which his opponent
makes oath he believes to be in the .party's possession, and the
other of which permits the master, where, on an application for
an order for inspection, privilege is claimed for any document,
to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the
validity of the claim of privilege. 3 1
An important addition to the powers of the court was made
in an extension of the originating summons, under which, by the
new Rule, any person claiming to be interested under an instru'

Order xXX, Rule x.

'"

R. S. C, May, 1897.

'Order XXXI, Rules i and 2.
'Order XXXI, Rules 19 A (I),

(2)

and (3).'
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ment in writing, may apply for the determination of any question
of construction arising thereunder, and for a declaration of his
" 2
rights.
Lastly, the Rule Committee paid their respects to.a difficulty
which had puzzled them for many years. Ever since Lord
Selborne's Procedure Committee of x881 had recommended the
complete abolition of pleadings the question of how to lessen the
expense and delay of bringing the parties to issue had always
been the first one discussed in any argument on procedural reform. Despite the improvements of 1893 in this regard, litigation was slowly drifting away from the courts into the hands of
boards of arbitration; in fact practically every business contract
contained a clause binding the parties to submit any dispute
arising therefrom to arbitrators, and the Arbitration Act, 1889,
was passed to provide a uniform mode of procedure in the
innumerable small arbitrations that were constantly going on.
The chief complaint against the law courts voiced by business
men was (and still is) that they never knew, after an action was
commenced, how long it would take to finish it or when the trial
would occur, whereas in arbitration they fixed on a time and
place for the hearing satisfactory to all parties-and the thing was
over without uncertainties to cause them worry. To win back
to the courts the suitors who were thus turning their backs upon
the judges, the Rule Committee invented a new procedure called
"proceeding to trial without pleadings," and enshrined it in the
R. S. C. as Order XVIII A. It provides that in any case where
he chooses to do so, the plaintiff may indorse on his writ "a
statement sufficient to give notice of the nature of his claim or of
the relief or remedy required in the action," and a further notice
"that if the defendant appears, the plaintiff intends to proceed
to trial without pleadings." Thereupon the defendant may
either insist that there should be pleadings and obtain the leave
of a master for them, or give mere notice of any special defences
and allow the action to be entered for trial. The intention of the
Rule Committee was to provide a speedy conclusion, analogous
m Order LIV A. This is described in §8 of this article, with originating
Summonses
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to the summary judgment under Order XIV procedure, for
claims which, though simple, were not liquidated and could therefore not obtain the benefit of Order XIV by being specially
indorsed. Laudable as that intention was, the design has failed
utterly of accomplishment. Order XVIII A has never found
favor with litigants and is now, for all practical purposes, useless. In the beginning it caused a great deal of confusion by
being confounded with Order XIV; solicitors would add to a
special indorsement under Order III, Rule 6, a notice under the
new Order, for trial without pleadings, so that their applications
for summary judgment put them in the position of asking for
judgment ,ithouta trial, in the same breath with which they were
asking for a trial without pleadings. But after that was cleared
up, plaintiffs were not attracted by the possibility of going to
trial without an inkling of the defendant's case, and practically
no one was hardy enough to take such a risk in exchange even
53
for the elimination of delay.8
It was obvious to those familiar with the situation that
Order XVIII A was an attempt to provide distinctive treatment
for commercial causes without arousing Lord Coleridge's firm
opposition to anything that would savor of the creation of a
separate court for them. He was "entirely opposed to a change
which involved the suggestion that all the members of the Bench
were not equally fit to cope with every subject of litigation. He
thought that all judges were, or ought to be considered, capable
of dealing with all classes of cases,""" 4 and it was his objection
that rendered futile the long continued effort to set up a separate
court or list for commercial cases. As far back as 1874, the
Judicature Commissioners in their Third Report definitely
recommended that mercantile trials should be before a judgeassisted by two skilled mercantile "assessors," instead of before
judges either alone or with juries whose knowledge of technical
'There appears to be only one reported case in twenty-one years interpreting the Order: Greene v. St. John's Mansions, 35 WEEKLY NoTEs,
(igoo). No others are cited in the 19r4 Red Book or White Book.
Co'From p. 13 of Mr. Theobald Mathew's: Practice of the Corqmercial
Court (London, sgo2).
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commercial matters was superficial. 55 But the proposal was
disregarded by the authors of the first Judicature Acts and nothing was done to provide specially for mercantile cases except to
continue the old sittings at the Guildhall, where actions were
tried with special juries from the City of London. These, however, were discontinued when the new Law Courts building at
Temple Bar was opened in 1882, and then the merchants became
even more impatient of the delays of justice, and more wedded
to the practice of informal arbitration of disputes. But arbitration has its disadvantages-at best it is good to settle only disputes of fact; where the dispute involves a point or points of
law ihe umpire's award is frequently incomplete or unsatisfactory. "For real acrimony and dispute," says a prominent
London solicitor, "give me a friendly arbitration where there
is a difference on the law." There were, therefore, frequent
efforts to persuade Parliament or the Bench to provide special
facilities for the trial of commercial actions by Her Majesty's
judges. In June, 1888, a special joint committee from the Law
Society and the Bar presented to the Lord Chancellor a report
which was -in effect an official petition from the profession for
the creation of a separate commercial list. Ih response to this
Lord Halsbury, in 1891, caused to be passed an Act to revive
the Guidhall Sittings, in the belief that if trials were once more
held within the precincts of the City itself, the City merchants
could be persuaded to come back to the court.ase But this
geographical concession quite overlooked the root of the difficulty-the delays and uncertainties of the trial list-and the new
move was a failure from the start. The Act has never been
repealed, but the Guildhall Sittings were soon abandoned. In
January, 1892, a joint committee of the Law Society and the
Bar, in submitting resolutions to the Lord Chancellor (to be laid
before the Council of Judges Lord Halsbury had been moved to
call), repeated the petition of the 1888 committee, expanding it
mPart Pap., 1874. XXIV, Reports from Commissioners, xiiL The
minutes of evidence relating to tribunals of commerce in Continental coun.
tries are a rich mine of information for comparative purposes.

I The Judicature (London Causes) Act, x89z, 54 & 55 Vict., c. i4.
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into a definitely outlined scheme for the disposal of cases of a
mercantile character in a separate list,35 7 and the Report issued
by the Council of Judges in June contained eight Resolutions
favoring the adoption of the scheme.3 58 Their plan included
the assignment of all mercantile cases to two judges who would
hear them independently of the general trial list, and the establishment of a special jury panel of mercantile men for the new
list-a kind of modern version of Lord Mansfield's famous jury
of merchants. But the Commercial List was one of the Council's suggestions which the Rule Committee refused to adopt in
1893, probably because of the Lord Chief Justice's well known
antagonism to it.
A few months later, in May, I894, the judges of the
Queen's Bench Division, under the power conferred upon them
by the Judicature Act to make arrangements among themselves
for the disposal of business coming into the Division, issued a
set of resolutions to regulate the composition of the trial lists, '
and in that document they inserted one resolution to the effect
"that it is desirable that a list should be made of Commercial
Causes to be tried at the Royal Courts of Justice by a Judge
alone, or by jurors summoned from the City." But it is significant that of the three names of Queen's Bench judges not among
those subscribed to the resolutions, one is that of Lord Coleridge,
the Lord Chief Justice, and that may explain why nothing was
done in pursuance of this part of the resolutions.
In June, 1894, Lord Coleridge died, and was succeeded by
Lord Russell of Killowen. The new Lord Chief Justice did not
share his predecessor's feelings about the Commercial List, and,
assured of his support, Mr. Justice Mathew and Lord Justice
Bowen, who, from the beginning, had been the most earnest
advocates of the new departure, perfected the arrangements they
considered necessary to inaugurate the List. In February, 1895,
there was issued the famous "Notice as to Commercial Causes,"
Printed in 36 SoucITORs' JoURNAL, 203 (January 23, 1892).
'Resolutions 32 to 39. Printed in 36 SoUCIToRS' JOURNAL, 719 (August
13, 189).
'These
appear in the Red Book and the Vhite- Book; also in 38
SOLICTORS' JOURNAL, 528 (June
894).
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which finally gave it birth. 6 0 The system it established is so
simple that it required no alteration in any Act of Parliament or
Rule of Court, and accomplished its object merely by giving full
exercise to powers already possessed by the judges. One judge
is designated to hear commercial causes, which are loosely defined
as "causes arising out of the ordinary transactions of merchants
and traders; amongst others, those relating to the construction
of mercantile documents, export or import of merchandise,
affreightment, insurance, banking and commercial agency, and
mercantile usages." A separate list is kept of such causes, called
the Commercial List, in which actions can be entered only by
leave of the judge for the time being taking the List. Once
entered in that List, the summons for directions and all interlocutory applications in the action are heard by the judge himself and not by a master. The List is independent of the general
trial lists, so the judge devotes his entire attention to it at all
times until every action entered in it has been heard. Furthermore, in disposing of interlocutory applications in this List he
exercises to the the full the powers conferred in the Rules to
eliminate pleadings, to restrict discovery, to relax the strict rules
of evidence, and to save expense at every turn. As a consequence the List is never in arrear and parties enjoy the great
benefit of being able to have a day certain appointed for the trial
which is mutually convenient.3 61
Part of the undoubted success of the Commercial List and
for speedy procedure must be ascribed to the fact
reputation
its
that comparatively few cases are entered in it.3 62 If all the
actions begun in the King's Bench Division could be given the
same attention by the judges it is certain that arrears would be a
thing of the past in every List as well as in the Commercial. 36 3
Book and the White Book; also in 39 SoLIc9,x895).
of the Commercial "Court" are fully described
in "Practice of the Commercial Court" (London, 1902) by Mr. Theobald
Mathew, a son of the late Lord Justice Mathew, who was the first judge to
take the List and who established the precedents for its efficiency.
'" In 1912 (the last year for which figures are available) there were altogether three hundred and fifty-eight summonses for directions in the Commercial List, out of a total of sixty thousand eight hundred and twenty-six
proceedings of all kinds begun in the King's Bench Division-about one-half
"This is also in the Red
IO1stS' JouitNAL, 245 (February
IThe
history and practice
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Nor has it had the effect of winning back to the Law Courts disputes that were going to arbitration. The number of arbitrations is considered by competent authorities to be as large as ever.
Sir John Macdonell, the King's Remembrancer, in the Civil Judicial Statistics for 1912, speaks of "the large and probably
increasing amount of disputes which are determined by arbitration. Many trades," he says, "have completely organized systems of arbitration for the settlement of disputes relative to
quantity and quality of goods and as to the performance generally of mercantile contracts." And again, "It is more and more
the practice to introduce an arbitration clause into contracts,
with the result that disputes are determined outside the Courts."
It must not be overlooked, however, that the Commercial List
does provide a forum where those who choose can obtain a
speedy judicial decision upon differences arising out of contracts
such as those for insurance or for carriage by sea-perhaps the
two greatest business activities in England.
Soon after the publication of the Rules of 1893, Lord
Herschell turned his attention to the larger problem which had,
for the moment, been put aside-the problem of revising and
codifying the Judicature Acts and Rules to relieve them of their
weaknesses in form.* The letters of Mr. Snow had stirred up a
good deal of publicity in favor of revision; in October, 1892, the
TImES had asserted that revision was an urgent need; and it was
generally acknowledged that the Rules were "thickly strewn with
pitfalls for the unwary practitioner."36' 4 Lord Herschell had
considered it imperative to introduce the new provisions before
attempting revision, and to that end he first completed the work
that resulted in the changes of 1893; that much out of the way,,
he and the Rule Committee returned, early in 1894, to the consideration of ways and means for the task of revision. The
of one per cent.--so it is apparent that it is not phenomenal if one out of
eighteen judges can keep the List free of arrears.
'In fact, there was complaint from the very start that commercial
suitors should get better treatment from a judge than other litigants. "The
greater the success of the Commercial Court the more unfair does its existence become towards all suitors who for good or bad reasons are excluded
from it."
A31 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 4 (November 5,18&z).
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result was to appoint Lord Justice Lindley and Mr. Justice
Charles (whose place was later taken by Lord Justice Kay) a
sub-committee to proceed at once with the actual work of revision, and the two judges began without delay. The profession
were delighted to hear that the work was under way, not only
for the reasons they had given expression to before, but because
the unexampled activity of the Rule Committee during the preceding year had made them weary of amendments and they
hoped a thorough revision would give them a respite of several
years from further changes."8 s The sub-committee gave a great
deal of time to the work, frequently going so far as to suspend
the sittings of their branch of the Court of Appeal, but before
they had gone very fa.r into the labor of digesting the huge mass
of Rules they decided it would be impossible for them to complete the revision unaided and they were authorized to delegate
the details of draftsmanship to experts employed for the purpose.
Mr. Snow, the editor of the White Book, was put in charge of
the actual drafting, associated with him being Mr. Francis A.
Stringer, the Head Clerk of the Writ, Appearance and Order
Department in the Central Office of the Supreme Court, and
Mr. W. Wills.
For over two years, the revisers toiled away at their compilation. In August, 1896, the sub-committee was able to place
before the Rule Committee for confirmation a new code of Rules,
completely ready for seryice. When this fact was published, it
was generally assumed that the new revision would be adoptedas of course, and that the "R. S. C. 1896" would replace the old
Rules of 1883. But for some reason the approval of the Rule
Committee was withheld. It was at first thought that there was
merely a delay about formally signing the new Rules, but gradually it became understood that differences had arisen as to the
acceptability of parts of the revision, especially where it departed
from strict codification to venture into novelties untried, and
that the whole thing would be dropped. It is certainly the case
W39 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 5 (November 3, 1894): "It is greatly to be
hoped that any such revision will have something of the character of finality

about it, and that we shall enjoy a period of rest from the constant changes
which bewilder and confuse practitioners.
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that the 1896 revision was not conducted under that close personal supervision which Lord Selborne, Lord Coleridge and Sir
George Jessel bestowed on the revision of 1883. Lord Herschell
went out of office soon after it was begun; Lord Halsbury, when
he returned to the Lord Chancellorship in 1895, was not personally interested in the enterprise; and Lord Russell of Killowen
was inclined to allow the sub-committee and their advisers a free
hand to work out the revision unhampered. At all events, when
the revision was completed it was found to contain matters to
which the approval of the more influential members of the Rule
Committee could not be extended, and although no formal action
was taken on the subject and no decision was ever published, the
revision never emerged from the Committee's consideration and
has never been heard' of since. Such was the fate of the only
official attempt at revision since 1883.366
Before Lord Herschell was removed from the custody of
the Great Seal by the General Election of 1895, he succeeded in
completing certain statutory reforms affecting the Ritle Committee, for which the demand was just as insistent as that for
the changes in the Rules themselves. The most important of
these was the Rules Publication Act, 1893, which imposed upon
the rule-making authority the duty to give due notice in public
form to their intention to make new Rules. 367 During the life
of the first code of Judicature Rules (1875-1883)

there was

frequent complaint about the absence of such a requirement; in
some cases the Rule Committee actually issued new Rules of
which the profession had no knowledge until after the date fixed
for their taking effect. After 1883, although the delays in publication were not so marked as before, practitioners had no means
of knowing officially that new Rules were in process of incubation. Only after they were actually signed would a notice be
published that they were to go into effect at a certain date, usually
I A letter from Mr. Snow to the editor of the SotciToas' JouRAx. (45
S. J. 97, December 8, xgoo) is the only stone that marks its grave. He and
his colleagues, he says, "completed the task after two years and eight months
very hard work. It was approved by the subcommittee and printed and sent
to all the judges. There the matter remains."
"56 & 57 Vict., c. 66.
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the beginning of the next sittings of the court. No opportunity
was offered for public discussion or for criticism by those likely
to be most intimately concerned. In the debate on the x883
Rules in the House of Commons, Lord Halsbury (then Sir
Hardinge Giffard) inveighed eloquently against "this silent and
secret mode of altering the law."3' 6 8 In the Report of the Law
Society's Committee of 1889, protesting against Mr. Justice
Kay's new Rule on costs of that year, appears this paragraph:
"These Rules

.

. were signed without any previous

communication with the profession, and the committee desire
that attention should once more be called to the importance, both
in the interests of the public and for the convenience of the
profession, of a sufficient opportunity being afforded to the repfor the consideration in draft
resentatives of the profession
'
of any proposed rules."3 9
Thereafter the Council of the Law Society worked unremittingly for recognition by Parliament of this necessity. In Feb,uary, i89o , the President of the Society announced at the
annual meeting "that the Council have prepared a Bill for introduction into Parliament providing that new Rules of the Supreme
Court and of the county courts should be published a specified
time before they are finally sanctioned, so as to afford opportunity for suggestions," and that Bill, known as the Statutory Rules
Procedure Bill, was read for the third time in the House of
Commons on August i, i89I, but got no further. In the following session Sir Albert'Kaye Rollit, a prominent member of the
Council, again introduced .the Bill, and this time, with Lord
Herschell's assistance, both Houses gave it approval, and it received the Royal Assent December 21, 1893, as the Rules Publication Act. It applies not only to Rules of the Supreme Court
but to all statutory rules made under the sanction of Acts of
Parliament-an ever increasing body of legislation-and requires
that they shall be published in draft in the Gazette forty days
before being finally signed. During that time interested parties
may obtain copies of the draft, and the rule-making authority is
Hansard, 3rd ser., vol. 283, coL 1S (August it, 1883).
r, j889).

33 SOuCITORS' JOURNAL, 496 (June
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required to consider suggestions or criticisms received upon it.
The Act has been of great usefulness, and frequently the Rule
Committee of the Supreme Court has, after the first publication
of draft rules, withdrawn a draft for alteration in accordance
with suggestions received.
.Another change effected with Lord Herschell's aid, after
five years of agitation by the Law Society, was the addition of
three active practitioners as members of the Rule Committee, by
the Judicature Act, 1894.370 That Act added to the Committee
the President of the Law Society for the time being (he is an
annually elected officer) and two barristers to be chosen by the
Lord Chancellor. The argument in favor of the change was
well put several years earlier in a legal journal:
"The learned judges who constitute the Rule Committee
have often to legislate on matters of which they have no practical knowledge, and are, therefore, liable, not merely to err in
alterations made by themselves, but also to have schemes foisted
upon them by persons outside their body, as to the practical
working of which the Rule Committee have no means of judging."
The practitioners in the Committee were further strengthened in i909 by the substitution for the President of the Law
Society of two solicitors, one from London and one from the
country,M as it was found that the President's annual term was
too short to permit of his becoming familiar with the work. This
was also in response to representations from the Law Society,
Mr. A. S. Mather of Liverpool having first suggested the change
72
in a paper read at the annual meeting in Jgo3.8

XL
From 1897 to the present may properly be called the third
period in the life of the code of 1883. Over one hundred and
seventy new Rules or amendments have been passed in this
interval, but they deal principally with matters of detail. In one
"57 & 58 Vict, c. z6, s. 4.
'9
Edw. VII, c. ix.
*
Printed in 47 SojcrTois" JouLRxi,

837 (October 17,

1903).
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respect, however, they have made an alteration in the actual
framework of procedure, and that is in further developing the
summons for directions. After the Commercial List had been in
operation a few months under the skilful guidance of Mr. Justice
Mathew, the Rule Committee were satisfied that ls arguments
for the possibility of eliminating, or at least regulating, the
delivery of pleadings had much to be said in their favor, and
they considered whether or not it would be feasible to extend
some of the methods -of the Commercial List to other litigations in the High Court. At the end of April, 1896, Lord
Halsbury summoned another Council of all the judges, for the
purpose, chiefly, of considering some rearrangement of the circuits, and at that Council a committee was appointed to ascertain
"whether the procedure now adopted in commercial cases might
be extended or assimilated to other cases." The committee reported several months later in favor of requiring all suitors to
apply to a master for leave to deliver pleadings, in something like
the way they had to apply to the judge in the Commercial List,
and in favor of granting leave to plead only where pleadings
would be necessary.
The following Spring, the Rule Committee issued a new
Rule i of Order XXX, ST3 making the summons for directions
compulsory in practically all actions in the High Court. In
framing the Rule, however, the Committee failed to take into
account the influence it would have on all the older provisions in
the Rules regulating the delivery of pleadings. Under the new
Rule a master alone must decide whether there should be any
pleadings at all in an action, and if any, what pleadings; previously, when the summons for directions was optional, it was
taken out in only a small proportion of cases, the suitors in all
the rest delivering pleadings mutually as of course, guided by
the Rules in the pleading Orders. The new Rule, therefore,
caused a great deal of confusion, as the pleading Orders were
left unchanged. As one commentator said: "It is an overriding
provision inserted into the midst of an existing code of proPrinted in 41 SO cIm'

JoutRAL, 507 (May 22, 1897).
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cedure rules, many of which it influences, some of which it
practically nullifies. '3 74 In practical operation, the masters decided to disregard the conflicting passages of the older Rules,
and guided themselves e: clusively by the terms of the new one.
This was the situation for several years, the masters in the
meantime collecting notes of all the conflicts in the Rules occasioned by the breadth of the new compulsory summons.
At length, in July, 1902, the Rule Committee put an end to
this anomaly by issuing a new set of Rules which swept out from
all the pleading Orders the inconsistencies introduced by the
change in Order XXX. At the same time they increased the
usefulness of the summons for directions by extending it to
include applications made after judgment in an action, in the
course of execution or attack upon the judgment. 375 The 19o2
Ruleg, unlike the provision of 1897, were carefully drawn, and
the same critic said "without hesitation, that the changes in procedure made during the year are distinct improvements, dearly
thought out, and as clearly embodied in the new Rules." 3 76
As the matter now stands, a summons for directions must
be taken out at the beginning of practically every suit, 3 77 so that
a master acquires seisin of the action and must be applied to for
instructions as to the appropriate steps to be taken by the parties.
Unfortunately the summons as administered is not fulfilling the
purposes for which it was intended. The intention was that
some idea of the nature of the case should be imparted to the
master upon the first hearing, so that his order could be moulded
to fit the requirements of each particular case. The fact is, however, that the solicitors' clerks who appear before the master
when the summons is first heard usually know little or nothing.
about the case, and the order made is almost always in common
form: pleadings by each side in so many days, mutual discovery,
41 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 857 (October 3o, 1897).
"They are printed together in 46 SoucITORs' JouRNAL, 646 (July
x9o2).
' 47 SOLICITORS' JoURNAL,

44

(November

i5,

ig,

19o2).

' The exceptions are admiralty actions, actions begun by originating sumnions, and actions begun by a writ specially indorsed under Order I1, Rule 6.
in the last case, however, if the application for summary judgment is refused, it is treated as an application for further directions.
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trial in London with or without a jury, and "leave to apply."
Any really individual treatment of the case is postponed to future
applications, when its merits are beginning to develop a little
more clearly, and the parties come back to the master under his
"leave to apply."37 8 One result is that the masters exercise complete control over every step that can be taken. Their leave must
be obtained and their decision followed in everything short of
the actual trial of issues by the judge in court. To assist practitioners, the King's Bench masters have,, like the taxing masters, issued a set of practice regulations, to which they add from
time to time, covering many details that are left to their discretion by the R. S. C. These "Practice Masters' Rules," unlike
the Practice Notes of the taxing masters, have no statutory
authority, as there is no Rule expressly authorizing their
37
formulation. '
Another set of Rules issued in 1902, which won the approval
and satisfaction of the profession, remodeled the system of taxing costs. 8s0 They were the result of an investigation conducted
in i9oi by a departmental committee whose report has not been
made public. They created at the Central Office a new department which took over the business of taxations from the scattered taxing officers in the several Divisions and branches of the
court, so that now all taxations are done, irrespective of the
nature of the action, by twelve masters among whom the- bills
are distributed for scrutiny according to a rota. It was made
possible for these masters to make uniform the exercise of their
discretion by the following addition to their powers:
"The taxing masters shall have power to revise and regulate the practice in regard to taxation of costs, and to the allowance of fees, so as to assimilate the allowances for costs and to
secure uniformity upon all taxations as far as may be practicable and expedient.'"2
'Testimony to this effect was given by Master T. Willes Chitty and by
Lord Justice Phillirnore before the recent Royal Commission on Delay in
the King's Bench Division. Parl. Pap. Cd. 6762, 1913, questions 282 and 1T4L
'They are printed in the 1914 White Book, pp. 2341-2363. They are
divided into twenty-seven sections, each containing a number of rules.
" R. S. C., January, i9o2. Signed December 13, i9o. They are printed
in 46 SoLICIToRs' JOURNAL, 134 (December 21, 1901).
I Order LXV, Rule 27 (37).
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Under this power the taxing masters issued a set of Practice
Notes in Hilary Term, 1902, popularly known as the "Blue
Book," which conveyed to the profession welcome instructions
in detail as to how they desired matters to be prepared for taxation and also announced what course would be taken by them in
allowing or disallowing many items of costs in respect of which
38 2
the precedents in the various Divisions were not unifornm
To these administrative Rules were added a few new directions affecting the taxations themselves. These are contained in
the regulations which make up Rule 27 of Order LXV. A most
interesting one of i9o2 reads as follows:
"On every taxation the taxing master shall allow all such
costs, charges and expenses, as shall appear to him to have been
necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending the rights of any party, but save as against the party who incurred the same no costs shall be allowed which appear to the
taring master to have been incurred or increased through overcaution, ncgligcnce or mistake or by payment of special fees to
counsel or special charges or expenses to witnesses or other
persons, or by other unusual expenses."'8
This is now the kernel of the whole Rule. It is the touchstone which the taxing master can apply to every item in a bill
of costs.
After i9o2 there is nothing of importance in the history of
procedure for over a decade. Around i9o9 there was a great
deal of agitation for the appointment of additional judges to the
King's Bench Division. A Royal Commission presided over by
Lord Gorell heard evidence on the subject in i9o7, and in i9o9 a
joint select committee of both Houses of Parliament went over
the ground again, with the result that in 1910 an Act was passed
increasing the membership of the King's Bench Division from
sixteen to eighteen judges as a temporary expedient until the
arrears in the trial lists were cleared off. s4 The question of
"'These Notes appear in the 1914 Red Book (the Yearly Practice), p.
2147. Under Order LXV, Rule 18, the distribution of work among the taxing
masters is left to be arranged by themselves, and they have issued regulations, which are reproduced in the note to the Rule in the Red Book.
Order LXV, Rule 27 (29).
M ioEdw. VII & I Geo. V, c. 12.
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arrears in the King's Bench Division has been a popular one for
Parliamentary oratory in recent years, although it has required
some effort of the imagination to find any serious arrears.
Early in 1913, after the matter had been once more considered by a committee of the Cabinet, it was decided, in order
to quiet further discussion, to appoint a Royal Commission to
investigate the alleged delays. 3s The Commission heard evidence from January to June; the minutes of this evidence are of
especial value, because it went further than merely to scrutinize
the organization of the court and the distribution of work among
the judges; it covered as well the procedure, with the idea that
speed in procedure means absence of arrears, and the testimony
published3 8 6 contains many interesting descriptions, by persons
in actual authority, of the duties performed by the various officers
of the court and the course of proceedings in each of their departments.AsT Several prominent witnesses confined themselves exclusively to procedural matters, and on their testimony the Commission based recommendations which will ultimately bear
fruit. 38 8 The Report was presented November 28, 1913, and
there is now a committee of judges considering the recommendations it contains.
(To be Concluded.)
Samuel Rosenbaum.
London.
m The Commission was presided over by Viscount St. Aldwyn, and included representatives of the Civil Service, the Bench, the Bar, and the Law.
Among the witnesses examined were nearly all the occupants of high judicial
office, many judges, quasi-judicial officers, barristers, solicitors, and others.
The Report and Evidence were published as Blue Books: Pal. Pap. Cd.
676i, 6762, 7177, and 7178 (1913).

To mention a few: duties of King's Bench judges described by Lord
Justice Phillimore in Questions io28-xo39 and i176; Chancery judges, by
Lord Cozens-Hardy, M. R, in Questions 473 and 492, and by Lord Justice
Swinfen-Eady in Questions 1249-1259; King's Bench masters, by Master
Chitty, in Questions 274-283; Chancery masters, by Master Fox, in Questions
4819-482o; registrars, by Mr. Registrar Farmer, in Questions 5037-503&
'The suggestions on procedure are tabulated in Appendix 8 to the
Report. Cd. 778, pp. 231-237.

